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EARLY twenty years have passed since I first crossed N the threshold of Widener J and K, the Historical 
Seminary rooms of Harvard  University, with a small group 
of inwardly disturbed, though outwardly self-assured, grad- 
uate students to begin Dean Haskins’ advanced research 
course, designated in the Official Register as “An Introduc- 
tion to the Sources of Mediaeval History.” There I was to  
learn shortly the truth of Professor Laski’s observation to  
the effect that the real intellectual discipline, imposed by the 
Dean’s keen mind and forceful personality, caused the stu- 
dent “to have his mind turned upside down, to  be driven 
back, by continuous questioning, against difficulties he either 
did not know or  sought to  avoid.”’ M y  memory is not en- 
tirely clear upon this next point, though I think I may safely 
assume an awkward attempt on my own part  to  conceal 
ignorance. A t  any rate, I recall the question well. It was 
probably the first heavy volley that Haskins ever fired a t  
me: “How foolish was Isidore, and why?” T h e  why was 
added characteristically as a caution against that weakness 
of human nature for making unsupported assertions. It was 
an eminently respectable question as I was to realize later 
with a certain feeling of pride that I had been chosen the 
one-or the first one, perhaps-to appear foolish that after- 
‘For footnotes see page 103 of thia pamphlet. 
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noon in the attempt to  answer it. However, a lasting im- 
pression had been made. M y  mind was to revert to  this 
problem and to speculate upon it in many an idle moment 
during the intervening years, and at  last this afternoon I 
feel that  I may suggest some avenues of approach to the 
answer, though I am not yet promising to  answer the ques- 
tion itself. 
At a later day, i t  became abundantly clear that the mind 
of St. Isidore could not be estimated safely upon any super- 
ficial consideration, especially since the greatest authorities 
on the mediaeval period offer puzzling and contradictory 
views which often appear the product of short-sighted de- 
preciation. None seems more unfair, largely because of 
what i t  leaves unsaid, than the criticism of the great author 
of The Mediaeval Mind ,  Dr. Henry Osborn Taylor, whose 
almost invariably sound and balanced judgments make the 
passage which I cite here all the more surprising. “By reason 
of his own habits of study, by reason of the quality of his 
mind, which led him to select the palpable, the foolish, and 
the mechanically correlated, by reason, in fine, of his mental 
faculties and interests, Isidore gathered and arranged in 
his treatises a conglomerate of knowledge, secular and 
sacred, exactly suited to the coming centuries.”’ This state- 
ment has done much to place Isidore in the poor light ac- 
corded him by subsequent text-book writers and to confirm 
his reputation for thin, dry, sterile, and jejune thinking. 
His  vast encyclopaedic compilation, the Etymologies, is, 
indeed, often cited as the prime exhibit of mediaeval inanity, 
even by the professed friends and devotees of the Middle 
Ages. Thus, Dom Leclerc describes it as a vast lumber-room 
in which were stowed away all the cast-off clothes of an- 
tiquity,* and James Westfall Thompson refers to it as “a 
sort of museum of desiccated antiquities of the classical 
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era.”‘ Carl Stephenson remarks upon the ridiculous con- 
trast “between the book’s lofty pretensions and its feeble 
performance,”6 while Lynn Thorndike has the dry suspicion 
that its handiness and convenience “tended to  encourage in- 
tellectual laziness and stagnation more than any anthology 
of literary quotations did.”O After noting Isidore’s lack of 
critical sense and poor record for veracity in their useful 
History of Later  Latin Literature, Professors Wright and 
Sinclair bespeak their disapproval of the bad influence of 
this tome upon later centuries, since from it “learned and 
unlearned alike gathered unquestioningly the fruits of a 
very much decayed tree of ancient knowledge.”’ This judg- 
ment closes, however, in a happier mood by chiding us lest 
we make merry at  Isidore’s expense, and by asking us to 
remember that he was as industrious as those titanic labor- 
ers in the vineyards of scholarship, Boethius and Cassio- 
dorus, and that “it was his misfortune to live a t  the end of 
a period when secular learning was disappearing.”* Even 
Brehaut, the author of the only extended monograph on 
Isidore, who consistently presents the subject of his study 
in the best possible light, says that the Etymologies “furnish, 
so to speak, a cross-section of the dCbris of scientific thought 
a t  the point where it is most artificial and unreal.”’ Profes- 
sor Laistner of Cornell strikes a higher note. H e  points out 
that “Isidore was a polymath whose literary labours touched 
every branch of human knowledge”” and that “it is easy to 
sneer a t  the Etymologies and to  point to  single items in the 
book which strike a modern reader as puerile,”” but goes on 
to  observe that this compilation was a genuine achievement 
considering the inaccessibility of the source material and 
the scarcity of scholars able to comprehend these sources. 
Finally he states that Isidore’s indulgence in etymological 
detail that is often fanciful and absurd “has tended to  ob- 
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scure the substantial merits and accuracy of much of his in- 
formation.”” Haskins who was not given to answering his 
own questions contents himself by urging, “the very fact 
that  Isidore was only a compiler gives him a representative 
quality which a more original work would have lacked.”la 
Miss Waddell, who always rallies to the cause of unappre- 
ciated mediaeval worthies from the rhinoceros indomitus, 
Abtlard, to  Gerbert “with the light of the everlasting bon- 
fire playing about his head,”“ alludes in a satisfied manner 
to  Isidore’s “monumental comm~n-sense.’~‘~ In a footnote 
in his Primer of Medieval Latin, C. H. Beeson offers a sound 
and fair, albeit sly, extenuation of Isidore’s eccentricity : 
“His influence was quite out of proportion to the intrinsic 
merit of his works. Many of his etymologies, however, are 
no worse than most ancient attempts and some modern ones 
to  explain the origin of a word.’”’ Finally we may close 
with the shrewd Christopher Dawson’s comment that, “In 
spite of their lack of literary quality, writers like Orosius and 
Isidore of Seville, Cassiodorus and Gregory the Great, did 
more to  shape the minds of later generations than many 
geniuses of the first order.”” 
In the face of such a diversity of opinion among modern 
specialists, we may risk several added questions : Did Isidore 
appear foolish to his contemporaries and immediate me- 
diaeval successors, or is his foolishness a more recent dis- 
covery? Was he grossly superstitious, or merely lacking in 
resources of fact and data? Was  he intellectually incompe- 
tent, o r  only struggling amid the thought currents of his time 
and so condemned to  be the product of his age? T h e  first 
question may be disposed of readily, when we consider that 
few scholars, if any, were more widely cited for reference 
purposes by later writers, and that fifty-four MSS of his Ety- 
mologies are still surviving outside Spain, together with 121 
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MSS of selections from the same work, all eloquent testi- 
mony of his eminence in the mediaeval world of letters. 
Indeed, Professor Rand has remarked that, “NO better way 
could be found to  an immortal and authoritative existence 
in the Middle Ages”’* than to  have been commended by St. 
Isidore. Also he was one of those towering figures, conspicu- 
ous in mediaeval times, whose names lent prestige to various 
works by virtue of false attribution. Isidore’s pseudonym- 
ousness ranges from the famous False Decretals in canon 
law to various minor lyric poems. And W. P. Ker in his 
little book, The  Dark  Ages,  provides a bit of final evidence 
in a line from the English version of the romance of the 
Destruction of Troy which he says “is as good an instance 
as could be found of (the saint’s) popularity,” a t  least 
among the half-learned-“And Ysidre in Ethernoleger 
openly tellis.”’@ I t  is a simple line ; even so, dictionaries and 
their authors seldom figure in popular fiction. 
T h e  other questions had best be considered perhaps 
against the background of the period. Surprisingly few 
details of Isidore’s biography have been preserved, though 
Lecky quotes from the D e  Rebus Hispaniae of the sixteenth 
century Jesuit historian, Mariana, the customary charming 
and edifying tale, appropriate to  every mediaeval saint, in 
this instance attesting the truth of the principle that constant 
exposure will wear away the most durable of materials. It 
runs in this wise: 
A Spanish boy, having long tried in vain to master his task, and driven 
to despair by the severity of his teacher [this reminds us of another literary 
gem, concerning the poet Horace and his master, Orbilius], ran way from 
his father’s home. Ti red  with wandering, and full of anxious thoughts, 
he sat  down to rest by the margin of a well, when his eye was caught by 
the deep fur row in the stone. He asked a girl who was drawing water 
to explain it, and she told him that it had been worn by the constant attri- 
tion of the rope. T h e  poor boy, who was already full of remorse for what 
he had done, recognized in the reply a divine intimation. “If,” he thought, 
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“by daily use the soft rope could thus penetrate the hard stone, surely a 
long perseverance could overcome the dulness of my brain.” H e  returned 
to his father’s house; he laboured with redoubled earnestness, and he lived 
to be the great St. Isidore of Spain (gran doctor de las Es$aiias).*O 
This is an interesting anecdote and may throw some light 
on Isidore’s later remarkable reputation for industry, though 
I hardly think it belongs in the same category with the Cic- 
eronian dream of St. Jerome, as evidence for the necessity 
of divine intervention to guarantee desirable saintly habits. 
I do not think the compiler of a dictionary is a person who 
could have ever needed to  be urged to work. However, 
returning to the veritable facts of his life, we know that he 
sprang from an orthodox Hispano-Roman family of Carta- 
gena, that his younger years were spent under the tutelage 
of his famous brother, Leander, who, as bishop of Seville, 
played the leading part, together with King Reccared and 
Pope Gregory, in the conversion of Spain from the Arian 
heresy to the Catholic faith, and that he was born in about 
the year 570, lived through the heart of the Christian “Dark 
Ages,” and died exactly thirteen centuries ago in 636,  having 
succeeded Leander as bishop of Seville and become the most 
distinguished scholar of the Latin West. Thus, he was al- 
most the identical contemporary of Mohammed whose fiery 
faith was destined to blaze across Spain and sweep away 
nearly every vestige of that Visigothic culture which Isidore 
had illumined. Also his youth and young manhood coin- 
cided with the closing years of Gregory the Great and Greg- 
ory of Tours. These three, Isidore in Spain, Pope Gregory 
a t  Rome, Gregory of Tours in Merovingian Gaul, together 
with the Venerable Bede in Anglo-Saxon England a little 
later on, were the brightest intellectual lights to shine over 
the dull wastes that stretch across two centuries and more 
from Boethius to Alcuin, or, to preserve the impression of 
aridity which has intrigued Professor Thompson, “the well 
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grows drier and the water worse as we advance from the 
fourth to  the sixth century, and by 600, as Gregory of Tours 
confessed, it was low tide in western Europe.”” The  condi- 
tions of the time did not favor the creative intellect or com- 
plete comprehension of the classical masters. Hence Bre- 
haut reminds us that physical reality was no longer appre- 
hended through systematic observation but, instead, atten- 
tion was concentrated upon the superior realities of the spir- 
itual world?* And it is precisely a t  this point that we dis- 
cover the clue which explains Isidore’s inadequacy in the 
realm of natural science. His  mind was attuned to the other- 
worldly mystery rather than the secrets of nature, although 
he seems to  be free from the dark, unreasoning terrors and 
the hideous fear of hell that cast a dull veil of melancholy 
about the soul of Gregory. H e  displayed an interest in secu- 
lar learning and the pagan authors, unusual in the age of 
the Pope who boasted that he spoke not according to the 
rules of grammar but as the spirit moved him, and who 
would have destroyed the Egyptians, not merely despoiled 
them. However, the writer of the Dialogues may be pre- 
sumed to have been influenced by sentiments and considera- 
tions very different from those entertained by the compiler 
of an encyclopaedia. Nevertheless, in Isidore, too, there 
was the “upward glance” which distracted from the world 
and man, despite his interest in the antique wisdom. 
Quite likely we need not tarry among Isidore’s minor 
works, largely theological’’ : a volume expounding certain 
books of the Old Testament, the Sentences devoted to  the 
nature of the Trinity and of the angels, his polemic against 
the Jews, D e  fide catholica contra Iudaeos, a book of scrip- 
tural allegories, a treatise on the duties of ecclesiastics, a 
strict monastic regula, and a devotional work, the Synonyma 
which has been called “a lamentation for the sorrows of the 
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world” after the manner of Job, with a Chronicle and a 
History of the Yisigoths of little value, copied in the main 
from earlier histories. Besides, somewhat more secular in 
nature, there are the Difercntiae in two books-On D i f e r -  
ences of V o r d s  indicative of his etymological predilection, 
and On Differences of Things, as between angels, demons, 
and men, between angelic and human wickedness, between 
the grace of God and the will of man-, a cosmological trea- 
tise On the Scheme of Creation, including the spiritual as 
well as the material universe, the Liber numerorum on the 
magical properties of numbers, and an important exposition 
of the physical science of the time, entitled D e  natura rerum. 
But casting all these into obscurity was the monumental en- 
cyclopaedia, designated Etymologiae or  Origines, which 
must be considered one of the most influential works, regard- 
less of its specific merit, to  fall within the purview of the 
student of the history of European culture, since it provided 
a large part of the informational content of scholarly 
thought for centuries in an especially concise, convenient, 
and accessible form. Isidore belonged to the age of manual, 
compend, and commentary, of glosses and annotations, of 
outlines, abstracts, epitomes, and epitomes of epitomes, in 
short, the text-book habit of mind, now inculcated so effec- 
tively in our modern secondary schools that  it requires ap- 
proximately four years for our universities to rescue our 
students from the “Dark Ages.” T h e  tabloid type of mind 
was dominant then as now, and it is probable that the de- 
mand for concentrated and predigested mental pabula re- 
mains a constant across the centuries from ancient Alex- 
andria to  modern New York, although this hardly excuses 
the scholar from falling a victim of it. 
On the other hand, a much more respectable appearance 
may be placed on Isidore’s labors, if we consider the real 
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utility of the Etymologies in providing a wide range of in- 
formation for a time desperately in need of it, to  say nothing 
of the pervasive, continuing influence which this compilation 
enjoyed through many subsequent centuries. Isidore be- 
longed to a period in which a single mind could still hope to  
encompass the entire range of human knowledge in the 
fashion of Aristotle. Also such Roman authors as Varro 
and the elder Pliny had continued the tradition of collections 
of general encyclopaedic information, though their works 
were of narrower scope and of a more literary tone. Thus, 
Varro and Verrius Flaccus developed a curious literary sci- 
ence of marked antiquarian flavor which interested itself 
in grammar, word-derivations, philology, and poetic allu- 
sions, while Pliny’s Natural History formed an extended sci- 
entific note-book and manual of miscellaneous matter that  
reached from the commonplace to the outer bounds of cre- 
dulity and included such varied subjects as “geography, man 
and his inventions, animals, plants, vegetable products, medi- 
cine and medicinal plants, metals, pictures, colours, and 
gems.”*‘ Besides, a minor type of encyclopaedia for  educa- 
tional purposes, of which the D e  nuptiis philologiae et  mer- 
curia’ of Martianus Capella expounding the Seven Liberal 
Arts in elaborate allegory may serve as an example, gave 
emphasis to the tradition of compends of ordered informa- 
tion, and the alphabetical arrangement of material, intro- 
duced by Flaccus, established the conventional dictionary 
method of presenting topics, which added to convenience 
and conformed with the epitomizing habit of mind, It was 
the purpose of these encyclopaedists to  provide an authori- 
tative body of knowledge expressed in general terms, in the 
manner most easy of access and most easy of comprehension, 
not to extend knowledge through scientific inquiry according 
to modern ideas. 
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Thus, we find that Isidore stands a t  the center of a move- 
ment, presenting scientific matter in encyclopaedic form, 
which derives from Aristotle’s History of Animals, Varro’s 
Antiquities, Seneca’s Natural Questions, Pliny’s Natural His-  
tory, the Geography of Claudius Ptolemy, the Collectanea 
of Solinus, the D e  nuptiis of Martianus Capella, and a trea- 
tise by Cassiodorus on the liberal arts, and which is continued 
in the D e  natura rerum of Bede, the D e  universo of Hra-  
banus Maurus, the D e  mensuia orbis terrae of Dicuil, John 
the Scot’s D e  divisione naturae, the D e  imagine mundi (ca.  
1100) attributed to  Honorius of Autun, the odd work of 
Bartholomew of England On the Properties of Things ( D e  
proprietatibus re rum) ,  Alexander Neckham’s De naturis 
rerum, the mighty Speculum maim of Vincent of Beauvais, 
even to  the Margarita philosophica of 1503, while much of 
the geographical information in the Otia imperialia of Ger- 
vase of Tilbury, the Chronicle of Otto of Freising and the 
Liber fioridus of Lambert of St. Omer is obtained from 
Isidore. By piling his debtors like Pelion on Ossa, we begin 
to  appreciate the measure of our man and his significance for 
the history of learning. However, this is all a scholarship of 
borrowing. Very much as the mediaeval chroniclers built up 
their narrative by continuation, each standing on his prede- 
cessor’s shoulders, so the structure of mediaeval science was 
erected by a cumulative process. Robert of Torigni con- 
tinued Sigebert of Gembloux, who continued Prosper of 
Aquitaine, who continued Sulpicius Severus and St. Jerome, 
who continued Eusebius Pamphili, who continued Josephus, 
who stood on the rock of the Old Testament, thereby per- 
fecting an historical record which should stand unchallenged 
from Creation to  the Judgment Day. Likewise, Vincent of 
Beauvais and Bartholomew of England in the great thir- 
teenth century, as well as Hrabanus in Carolingian days, bor- 
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rowed from Isidore, who copied from Solinus, who ab- 
stracted from Pliny, who appropriated from Aristotle, who 
sent his students to the far  corners of the earth, gathering 
his data. T h e  ultimate credit for  some measure of the valid 
science, available in western Europe a t  the dawn of the mod- 
ern period, belongs to those longforgotten anonymous stu- 
dents of the “Master of Those W h o  Know.” In  the light 
of such respectable and saintly borrowing, the sin of plagi- 
arism reduces to  a pale, thin, academic discussion unworthy 
of scholars and gentlemen. I t  was the students then as now 
who were the true contributors to and sufferers for  the ad- 
vancement of learning. A brief example in illustration of 
this tendency may be found if we take the case of the sala- 
mander. Like the small boy today, mediaeval men were in- 
trigued by Natural History, especially animals [ that is why 
they loved their Pliny so] ; hence we may assume this ex- 
ample is typical of the continuing process, whereby antique 
science was perpetuated. Aristotle in his History of Animals 
in the fourth century B.C. said: “NOW the salamander is a 
clear case in point, to show us that animals do actually exist 
that fire cannot destroy; for this creature, so the story goes, 
not only walks through the fire but puts it out in doing  SO."'^ 
The  story has grown in the telling with Isidore, though he is 
really only abstracting from Pliny :26 
T h e  Salamander is so called because he prevails against fire. Among 
all venemous creatures, he is the mightiest; others kill individuals alone, 
but the salamander kills several a t  once. If he crawls upon a tree, he 
taints all the fruit with his poison, and they who eat of it perish; or  if 
he falls into a well, they who drink therefrom die. H e  alone of all ani- 
mals, fighting against fire, extinguishes i t ;  for he lives in the midst of 
flames, neither harmed nor conquered by them, and not only is he not 
burned, but he puts out the fire.27 
When we come to Bartholomew of England in the thirteenth 
century, the story is shorter but it has also grown : “The sala- 
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mander quencheth the fire that he toucheth as ice does, and 
water frozen."" 
To those who are curious to know more regarding the 
specific contents of the Etymologies and the way in which the 
various topics are treated, I must state regretfully that no 
translation from the Latin text exists save for selections in 
Brehaut's monograph, and that in many places the work is 
almost untranslatable, owing to the necessary play upon 
words involved in establishing their derivations. The  struc- 
ture of the treatise consists of twenty books, devoted to  the 
seven liberal arts, medicine, law, chronology, the Scriptures, 
the offices of the Church, God, the angels and saints, the 
alphabet, languages, races, men, monsters and animals, the 
universe, the earth, stones, metals, plants, architecture and 
surveying, warfare, games and pastimes, ships, dress, food 
and drink, even household furniture. Thus, the work is very 
comprehensive, the Encyclopaedia Britannica of the Middle 
Ages; and the longest book is on animals. I shall try to give 
a few samples from the section on chronology which is sub- 
divided into minutes, hours, days, months, years, lustra 
(periods of five years), centuries, and ages. Of days, he 
says : 
T h e  day is the presence of the sun, or  the sun above the earth, just as 
night is the sun under the earth. Whether it be day or  night depends 
upon whether the sun be above the earth or  beneath it. T h e  t rue day is 
twenty-four hours in length, so that day and night include within their 
span, in accordance with the revolution of the heavens, the interval from 
sunrise to sunrise. Incorrectly, however, a day is the space from sunrise 
to sunset. There  are, then, two parts of the day, day and night; day is, 
to be sure, twenty-four hours in length, but it is also a space of twelve 
hours.2D 
You can see the subject is becoming involved; it becomes posi- 
tively complex, when he explains the days of the week, so 
that the battle is on between Saturday, the Sabbath, and 
Sunday, the Lord's Day, for primacy in beginning the week. 
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Next he tackles morning, noon, and evening, with much 
esoteric etymology, but this is all naught compared with the 
recondite distinctions between today, tomorrow, yesterday, 
day before yesterday, and day after tomorrow (hodie,  cras, 
hesternum, pridie, perendie)." If you do  not think this is 
difficult, try writing an essay on these subjects yourself. Af- 
ter this effort, he examines the week, and like one of my col- 
leagues who stimulates his students on occasion by announc- 
ing that reading will be assigned hebdomadally, Isidore pre- 
sents the topic under the caption De Izebdomada and faces 
the prospect of Greek derivation cheerfully, if not compe- 
tently." The  ages are interesting and may be distinguished 
in two ways, as in the ages of man, infancy, youth, and old 
age, or  as in the ages of the world of which the first extends 
from Adam to Noah, the second from Noah to Abraham, 
the third from Abraham to David, the fourth from David to 
the Captivity of the Jews in Babylonia, the fifth from the 
Captivity to the Advent of the Saviour in the flesh, and the 
sixth in which we now live, continuing thence to the end of 
the world and the Last Judgment." Then follows a de- 
tailed outline of historical events arranged in a sort of chron- 
ological chart or table, so that each is included within its 
appropriate age. 
There remains still the matter of Isidore's criteria in the 
selection of his material. For  the most part, he accepts St. 
Augustine's principle that secular knowledge must conduce 
to Christian ends and approves the patristic practice of util- 
izing the pagan authors in the interest of Christian truth. 
However, Isidore does not disparage or  reject his classical 
heritage ; he merely adapts it to the lower intellectual level 
of  the seventh century, but in this process of adjustment the 
antique habit of thought is transformed to meet Christian 
needs. Brehaut points out in this connection that Pliny wrote 
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a survey of “what was known,” while Isidore wrote a survey 
of “what ought to be known.” T h e  relative scientific objec- 
tivity of the ancient writer is replaced by an authoritarian 
formulation, resting upon dogmatic preconceptions, though 
it is only fair to add that Pliny’s credulity is sometimes such 
that Isidore could have imagined nothing more unlikely. 
Hearsay may be as misleading as revelation or  the authority 
of a book. Finally, Isidore faced the difficult problem of 
selecting from a wide range of material, and the resultant 
eclecticism led to incoherence. However, since his incon- 
sistency was based upon authority, he was never called upon 
to face the question of intellectual integrity and so easily be- 
came an authority himself. H a d  he questioned his sources, 
he would have lost standing forthwith. But as an authority, 
he remained a soundly catholic, conservative scholar, not to 
be mentioned in the same breath with that line of dangerous 
radicals, leading from Eriugena, Gerbert, and AbClard, 
through the Averroists and Siger de Brabant, Michael Scot, 
Roger Bacon, Leonard of Pisa, Raymund Lully, and Arnald 
of Villanova, to Copernicus, Giordano Bruno, and Galileo. 
Isidore’s science was “good” science, deductive and authori- 
tative by grace of God;  theirs was “bad” science, induced 
from nature in some cases and only as sound as human un- 
derstanding; to them fumes of sulphur clung faintly, and 
about them hung a lurid glare. In  this connection, I am 
tempted to quote a statement from Lecky’s History of the 
Rise and Inpuence of Rationalism in Europe that  during the 
Middle Ages, “Innovation of every kind was regarded as a 
crime ; superior knowledge excited only terror and suspicion. 
If it was shown in speculation, it was called heresy. If it 
was shown in the study of nature, it was called  magi^."'^ 
Nevertheless, this attitude lingers still a t  the present time. 
No t  so long ago I read an editorial in which the writer 
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sneered at  the views of Einstein, on the ground that the 
editor himself could not understand them, thereby making 
the measure of Einstein’s genius the degree of his own com- 
prehension. 
If we attempt to  analyze and account for the peculiar 
cast of mind apparent in Isidore, we must turn back some 
centuries to  the Academy where Plato advanced his doctrine 
of absolutes in which ideas are regarded as objective in char- 
acter and antecedent to  things. These ideas rise from the 
concrete to the general until a t  the pinnacle of his thought- 
structure, we reach certain ultimate concepts or  universals, 
as “the Good, the Beautiful, and the True,” which are highly 
abstract and comprehensive and which represent final reality. 
It was an axiom of the Realist school of the later Middle 
Ages that universalia sunt ante res; ideas pre-exist things, 
the world, and man. In other words, reality consisted in 
certain transcendental concepts which are immaterial and 
metaphysical by nature, and, therefore, not susceptible of 
any scientific physical analysis. Next let us ask: What  hap- 
pens to things in such thought processes? What  is the nature 
of res? In short, we may reply that the natural universe and 
everything in it become a reflection and a shadow of a men- 
tal and spiritual realm which is ultimate and real. And be- 
cause these ideas are a final goal and essential reality, they 
are complete in themselves, ideal, perfect, and absolute in 
authority. T o  such an extent was the mediaeval mind com- 
mitted to this view of reality or, as certain critics might say, 
charmed by its own creations that some thinkers denied the 
perceptions of the senses willingly, when their evidence ran 
counter to accepted principles. I shall not confuse the matter 
by entering into the discussion of the relative ranks or grades 
of ideas, for we have ideas about ideas as well as ideas about 
simple things. Years ago a fraternity brother took his doc- 
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torate in Philosophy and centered his dissertation more or  
less about this problem. H e  wrote on the nature of res or  
“the thing,” and became such an intellectual contortionist 
as to confuse me about every or any res thereafter. 
However, we must beware of the misconception that me- 
diaeval men went about ever-conscious of their debt to  Plato, 
for, while the typical mediaeval habit of mind was Platonist, 
the men of the Middle Ages were largely unaware of Plato 
and Platonism, or, as Friedell puts it, Plato merely taught 
this theory of ideas whereas the Middle Ages lived it.ac T h e  
Platonism of the Middle Ages was not an academic or a 
scholastic Platonism; in fact, Plato was not widely read 
throughout that period, save, perhaps, for the Timaeus, a 
metaphysical treatise which hovers between mind and mat- 
ter. His  discursive style and dialogue form were not at- 
tractive in an age devoted to  compend and manual, while 
the text-book character of Aristotle’s writing was fitted ex- 
actly to  the mental habits of the time. Whether you are 
reading the Poetics or the History of Animals Aristotle 
sticks to  his topical arrangement with main headings and sub- 
headings in perfect outline, but Plato writes in a literary 
manner, compelling his reader to seek his meaning. Thus, 
the form of Aristotle’s thought with its ordered learning is 
much closer to that of the mediaeval encyclopaedists and 
commentators; yet the color, atmosphere, and substance of 
the mediaeval mind, as a whole, are predominantly Platonic. 
It is obvious that, since the Middle Ages did not become 
acquainted with Plato through his books, the channels 
through which his attitudes and views flowed down into the 
later time must be traced back to other sources. There is the 
direct Christian channel, proceeding from St. Paul as exempli- 
fied in the Fifteenth Chapter of First Corinthians where the 
distinction between the natural body and the spiritual body is 
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expressed in terms, readily understandable in the light of 
the Realist philosophy and its doctrine of objective uni- 
versals. But more significant for the history of science is the 
murky, sluggish, devious current of Neoplatonism, which 
falls as off a precipice from the transcendental realms that 
lie beyond reason to lose itself in the stagnant swamps of 
magic and superstition. Yet, a t  its best, Neoplatonism re- 
tained the exalted idealism of Plato and his disinterest in 
material things, so that it underlies both the otherworldly 
motive and the ascetic impulse which are intrinsic in the 
mediaeval soul. On the other hand, in the Neoplatonic sys- 
tem the ultimates which are less sharply formulated in 
Plato’s teaching are perceived in a central unifying principle, 
an absolute comprehensive Unity, which passes by emanation 
down to the Nous or perfected universal Mind and so 
through the World-Soul to the souls of men. In  its extreme 
manifestation, asceticism resulted in a contempt of the flesh, 
an abhorrence of matter, and a disparagement of empirical 
knowledge, fatal to the development of a sound objective 
and inductive scientific method. T h e  abandonment of the 
world of particular phenomena was accompanied by the 
adoption of purgative measures intended to lead man up- 
ward through ever more refined and perfect stages until his 
soul was fit to know the Absolute Intelligence, the Ultimate 
Unity, or, let us say, to know God. These last steps could 
not be achieved by any exercise of reason but by a mystic 
process, a final leap into the unknown, an ecstatic emotional 
experience in which knowledge is attained by agencies that 
lie beyond the imperfect senses and reason in what Taylor 
terms the sphere of the suprarational. T h e  Neoplatonist 
metaphysics with its doctrine of discarnate and incorporeal 
mediate intelligences or daemones made possible an eventual 
hierarchy of mind and spirit, extending from the material 
world to the Absolute. 
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In its Christian application a t  the hands of Dionysius the 
Areopagite (the pseudo-Dionysius), this assembly of medi- 
ators blossoms forth in the graded ranks of the Celestial 
Hierarchy, arranged in nine orders : Angels, Archangels, 
and Principalities ; Powers, Virtues, and Dominations ; 
Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim; while to each order is 
assigned its specified task. Thus, it was allotted to the high- 
est order of the Seraphim that they should “veil the face 
and feet of God.” And in the Absolute One, the Universal 
Immanence, it is not hard to discern the Triune From 
these beginnings, St. Thomas constructed his theory of 
angels as incorporeal beings who think only in terms of uni- 
versals or, a t  least, comprehend the particular only through 
the universal, whereas man’s limited intelligence must deal 
with particulars alone or, a t  most, comprehend the universal 
dimly through the particular. It must be noted that the psy- 
chology of the angels is developed soundly from his funda- 
mental premises by deductive logic, but it does not demon- 
strate the objective existence of angels following observa- 
tional modes of appr~ach .~’  The  metaphysical method 
shows that angels are intelligible and possible, but does not 
prove that they exist in any forms satisfactory to natural 
science, since, indeed, by definition they cannot have any 
tangible, material actuality, and, hence, cannot be inspected 
or  dissected in a laboratory. In the same way, disembodied 
spirits become credible or,  a t  least, plausible, such as we find 
in the legend of the priest of Isis who declared to  Plotinus 
that he could raise up the spirit of Plotinus himself in visible 
form which he proceeded to do after the appropriate invo- 
cation with the singular result that “Plotinus stood face to 
face with his own s0uI.~’” Of course, I am not asking you to 
believe that this tale is necessarily true, nor can I explain 
how an immaterial spiritual substance may become visible. 
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Nevertheless, the implication of these beliefs is significant 
for the history of science. A habit of mind appears, highly 
favorable to  the idea that spirits or  superior powers may be 
utilized or  invoked to  control matter and nature. Here  men 
do not attempt to investigate nature, only to control her 
through the proper occult formulae. This strange mental 
climate belongs to  the realm of magic and theurgy. 
The  problem of magic is too confused and complex to 
consider in brief space. However, the essential feature of 
magic appears to me to consist in a failure to  comprehend 
natural causation. Instead, it seeks “short-cuts” into the 
supernatural to explain and to produce the natural, because 
it considers that  the forces or  powers which occasion nature 
lie outside and above nature. There is no clear conception 
of the scientific relation of cause to effect within the material 
world, so that false causes are attributed constantly to the 
most obvious phenomena. Under such circumstances, it be- 
came easy for St. Isidore to regard words as “transcendental 
entities,”” similar to the ideas in Plato’s scheme of thought. 
Thus, words hold much the same place in the economy of 
Isidore’s thought as universals among the later Realists. 
They are objectively existent and independently efficient. In 
the same way, St. Augustine’s theory of number dissolves 
into number mysticism, providing “paths of intelligence” 
through the universe, material and imrnate~ial.~’ According 
to such a doctrine of absolutes, Isidore’s Liber tzumerorum 
which “tells the qualities and mystical significance of every 
number from one to sixteen, and of the chief ones between 
sixteen and sixty” becomes comprehensible, if not convinc- 
ing, and is certainly no mere foolishness but posited on a defi- 
nite philosophy. I cannot agree with Taylor apropos of this 
work that it is difficult to  find “an apter instance of an ecclesi- 
astical writer elaborately exploiting the most foolish state- 
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ments that  could possibly be found in the writings of a great 
Nor can I go quite as far  as Thorndike who 
says that we have only an example of “mental magic and 
pious ‘arithmetic’,” combining the mysterious properties of 
numbers and words,P’ when Isidore defines the modius in his 
Etymologies as follows : 
T h e  nzodius is so-called because it is of perfect mode. F o r  this measure 
contains forty-four pounds, that is twenty-two sextarii. And the reason 
for this number is that in the beginning God performed twenty-two works. 
For  on the first day H e  made seven works, namely, unformed matter, 
angels, light, the upper heavens, earth, water, and air. O n  the second 
day only one work, the firmament. On the third day, four things: the 
seas, seeds, grass, and trees. On the fourth day, three things: sun and 
moon and stars. On the fifth day three: fish and aquatic reptiles and flying 
creatures. On the sixth day four: beasts, domestic animals, land reptiles, 
and man. And all twenty-two kinds were made in six days. And there 
were twenty-two generations from Adam to Jacob-And twenty-two 
books of the Old Testament-And there are twenty-two letters from 
which the doctrine of the divine law is composed. Therefore in accordance 
with these examples the modius of twenty-two sextarii was established by 
Moses following the measure of sacred law.42 
Brehaut seems to me to be correct when he says that the 
dictionary method of Isidore in the Etymologies is based not 
on mere convenience alone but upon philosophic grounds as 
well, and that the weakness of this method consists in an 
avoidance of “consecutive tho~gh t . ” ‘~  Isidore’s thought does 
not follow through. In  other words, it neglects or does not 
perceive the fundamental relation of “cause and effect” ; 
hence his treatment is magical, not scientific in the best sense. 
But it is not foolish. 
Mediaeval science, then, regarded nature as the result of 
an absolute and superior power which revealed itself in 
special ways, and allegory played its part  in causing this 
science to be organized on a basis of mechanical correlations 
which were established by artificial analogy, not by logical 
analysis. T h e  mediaeval mind was satisfied with surface 
relationships among disparate data, whereas the tendency of 
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modern thinking is toward the establishment of an organic 
synthesis of such material. W e  must remember that me- 
diaeval thought began from a pole opposite to  that of the 
present day, as, for example, when we find moral and mysti- 
cal meanings attached to the letters of the alphabet or  to ani- 
mals, metals, colors, and gems. Also the attempt is made to 
account for the material universe by processes of reasoning, 
not observation, as when we are told that the earth, being 
round and in a circle, has neither beginning nor end. In 
accordance with these tendencies, mediaeval scientific method 
becomes a search for the unique rather than the typical, and 
analogy is preferred to analysis. Such casual mechanical cor- 
relation and mere superficial resemblance, lacking organic 
significance, led to  the doctrine of correspondences which 
was accepted as valid proof. W e  have already seen an ex- 
ample of this in the modius where Isidore places great weight 
upon certain coincidences involving the number twenty-two. 
However, the analogical approach is as fundamental as the 
acceptance of the objective existence of ideas, universals, 
and their appropriate discarnate spirits or  intelligences. 
Theoretical physics begins with the four ultimate elements 
(fire, air, earth, and water),  themselves sometimes regarded 
as derived from a prima materia or  quinta essentia still more 
ultimate. T h e  four kinds of matter in the physical universe 
are based upon these elements and stratified according to  
the principle of weight, while each stratum is inhabited by 
suitable creatures: the fiery heavens, by angels; the air, by 
birds and demons; the water, by fishes; the earth, by the 
animals and man. These four elements may be transmuted 
from one to another through the four possible combinations 
of the basic qualities (hot and dry, hot and wet, cold and 
wet, cold and dry).  Thus, ice (cold and dry) becomes 
water (cold and wet) ; this becomes steam (hot  and wet) 
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which dissolves into air (hot and dry) .44 Physics and chem- 
istry are simple enough, if you know the proper equations, 
although this arrangement had its complexities in the me- 
diaeval pharmacology when you prescribed a remedial com- 
pound according to the degrees or  relative proportions of 
the several qualities of its components. Sugar, for instance, 
is cold in the first degree, warm in the second degree, dry in 
the second degree, and moist in the first degree. Mediaeval 
science is a seamless garment, and medicine is associated with 
physics. By analogy man is the universe writ small, and an 
exact parallel exists between man and all his parts, and the 
structure of the universe. Thus, six hundred years later, 
Robert Grosseteste, arguing in exactly the same way, de- 
clared that man, like the world itself, is compounded of the 
four elements: his flesh is earth;  his blood, water;  his spir- 
itus, air ;  his vital heat, fire.'' This curious doctrine of the 
microcosm and the macrocosm made possible a visual repre- 
sentation in the anatomical or  astronomic man who still re- 
mains as a mediaeval survival on the front page of our mod- 
ern almanac. T h e  Humoral Pathology, based on the four 
cardinal humors (black bile, yellow bile, blood, and phlegm), 
was developed by a correlation with the four ultimate ele- 
ments and the four basic qualities, so that health depended 
upon the right balance or  blending of these This, 
in turn, made possible further permutations and combina- 
tions in the medical equations. Geography fell into line with 
the quarters of the compass and the seasons of the year, and 
biology with the four ages of man. It was no coincidence 
surely that, when the bodies of the three magi were exhumed 
a t  Milan in 1164, as Robert of Torigni tells us, one seemed 
to be fifteen years of age, the second thirty, and the third 
sixty. 
Throughout mediaeval science is an integrated nexus of 
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ideas resting upon ultimate universals. Consequently it is 
deductive and authoritative in character, establishing its 
proof by dialectic, not inductive and analytical, although it 
is observational to the extent that it notes analogies and 
seeks for them. Even history, lacking an adequate perspec- 
tive of the past, yields to the analogical method by adopting 
the hexameral chronology of the six ages, corresponding to  
the six days of Creation. Brehaut has suggested that the 
mediaeval scientist was fascinated by the doctrine of the 
creation much the same as a modern scientist by the doctrine 
of evolution. H e  means that each of these theories may 
serve as a decisive point of departure or  a sign pointing the 
way toward a path fruitful for further speculation. T h e  
creation appeared a most significant scientific fact, because 
it was the precise “point a t  which the natural emanated from 
the ~upernatural.”‘~ Also the supernatural world was the 
demonstrable and real ; its phenomena alone possessed order 
and validity. On the other hand, the material universe was 
relatively unknown and unknowable, since no importance 
could be attached to the faulty evidence obtained through 
mere sense-percepti~n.‘~ Elsewhere Brehaut makes another 
important statement regarding the remarkable coherence of 
the mediaeval system of science : 
[Mediaeval thinkers] were firmly convinced of the solidarity of the 
universe; they felt its unity much more strongly than they did its multi- 
plicity; what we regard as separate kinds of phenomena and separate ways 
of viewing the universe they regarded as of necessity closely inter-related. 
There  were no categories of thought that were for them mutually ex- 
clusive ; they carried their ideas without hesitation from the material into 
the immaterial, and from the natural into the supernatural. No concep- 
tion established in one sphere seemed impertinent in any other. I t  was 
this state of mind that enabled the mediaeval thinker to take such erratic 
leaps from one sphere of thought to another without any feeling of uncer- 
tainty or any fear of getting lost.48 
In the end, it must be borne in mind that mediaeval science 
is always science in its broadest literal sense of organized 
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knowledge regardless of whether the knowledge rests upon 
authoritative statement or  observed fact. As we have seen, 
the encyclopaedic approach, authoritarian and deductive 
from accepted principles and standard subject-matter, is 
characteristic of the Middle Ages, whereas the experimental 
method, based on induction from observed and controlled 
data, leaves during the same period only vague and occa- 
sional traces to serve as harbingers of the modern age. 
Nevertheless, curiosity seems to be a quality of mind that, 
fortunately for  human progress, is a t  no time wholly dead. 
Such men as Adelard of Bath, the Emperor Frederick 11, 
and Roger Bacon continued from time to time to question, to 
examine, and to experiment, though Henry Osborn Taylor 
points out that  Bacon is never entirely clear about the nature 
of the scientia experimentalis which he had learned from the 
amazing Master Peter of Maharncuria (Maricourt)- 
whether it was a science in its own right and an end in itself 
that  could test the soundness of the conclusions in all the 
other sciences or  whether it was “a means and method uni- 
versally applicable to all scientific investigation” in the Aris- 
totelian sense.5o But there was no doubt of deliberate method 
and rigid control in Frederick’s experiment to determine the 
original tongue of man by secluding from all hearing of 
human speech two infants who had not yet learned to  talk, 
until he could learn whether they would speak Hebrew spon- 
taneously which seemed probable, or  whatever other less 
likely circumstance might ensue. I t  is an unimportant epi- 
logue to note that the children died before the completion 
of the e~periment .~’  I t  is, indeed, not inaccurate to say that 
mediaeval science had always been observational in its 
search for  analogies and experimental, in some measure, in 
its attempt to  control nature, as in magic and alchemy; yet 
these exceptions do  not vitiate the general principle that the 
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primary purpose of that science was the construction of a 
universe rather than investigation of the universe. 
Mediaeval research remained a t  all times very largely 
research in books, and the problem of going out to  nature or  
back to books, if it arose a t  all, was settled by the cloistered 
scholar who went back to  books. An amusing, though 
pointed, illustration is given by Lewes in his History of Phi- 
losophy concerning a mediaeval student who “having de- 
tected spots in the sun, communicated his discovery to a 
worthy priest. ‘My son,’ replied the priest, ‘I have read 
Aristotle many times, and I assure you that there is nothing 
of the kind mentioned by him. Go rest in peace, and be cer- 
tain that the spots which you have seen are in your eyes and 
not in the sun.’ ”51 However, the story seems less ridiculous, 
when we recall that the Ptolemaic theory constructed a uni- 
verse which was mathematically true to its hypotheses and 
was demolished only when the burden of accumulated ob- 
served evidence to the contrary was too great for tradition 
to  resist. Similarly modern mathematical physics or  astro- 
physics constructs our universe from the point that it leaves 
observed data and begins to infer the unseen. T h e  form of 
modern thought differs from that of the Middle Ages as we 
have noted; yet there may not be such wide variance between 
truth in the guise of an angel or  universal, and truth ex- 
pressed in a mathematical symbol or Dirac’s non-observable 
particle of negative mass (let us say),  as Eric Temple Bell 
might lead you to  suppose in his recent frantic Search f o r  
Truth which he finds “bogged” in the mediaeval morass.5a 
H e  might do well to consider an observation once made by 
Ferdinand Lot that “mathematical speculation, wherein the 
mind wanders through infinity without ever meeting an 
obstacle or  attaining control over facts, presents certain 
analogies with metaphysical speculation. I ts  processes and 
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solutions cast the soul into an ecstasy, almost pathological. 
Discovery by the power of reason alone leads to  the belief 
that  by juggling with formulae, one can penetrate the secrets 
of nature and submit them to the will of man. Thoughtless 
admiration for mathematics supports or  reintroduces the 
mentality of magic.”s4 This, too, is extreme, sardonic, and 
somewhat facetious ; possibly both critics are mistaken. Per- 
haps the one should seek the peace of the Holy Grail and 
the inner vision of Parzival, while the other should study 
more mathematics. In the end, it seems best to say that, 
when the infinite extent of the realm of learning is perceived 
and taken to heart and mind, we cannot longer regard any 
human knowledge or the results of any investigation as 
final whether they eventuate in the rigid mechanical deter- 
minism of recent science, in the mediaeval resort to provi- 
dential explanation, or  in the worship of Tyche, the Greek 
goddess of “gambler’s choice” or  utter chance. Viewed in 
perspective, can we assert that  the universe of Einstein will 
be lasting, whereas the universe of Ptolemy has passed away, 
o r  shall we assume that we must go on constructing uni- 
verses as long as science shall endure, all equally true and all 
equally non-existent ? 
But, since Providence reigned supreme in the Middle 
Ages, a concluding word must be spoken of her exalted ex- 
pression in mediaeval allegory and symbolism. Professor 
Rand has remarked that, when St. Ambrose read a passage 
from the Scriptures, he read it not merely once a t  a time, but 
four times a t  a time, “literally, morally or tropologically, 
allegorically or  mystically, and anagogically” in accordance 
with mediaeval canons of scriptural interpretation.” Like- 
wise, when mediaevalman read the Book of Nature, he hadno 
eyes for the beauty depicted therein, but sought secret hidden 
meanings and saw only a high symbolic and sacramental 
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purpose. To  be acceptable natural beauty must be inter- 
preted; she must be helped to rise above herself. Otherwise 
she was a thing to be shunned as the tempter’s snare set in 
lurking to  catch the unwary traveler along the path of life. 
St. Benedict established that mighty fortress of God and 
sacred learning, the monastery of Monte Cassino, in an 
isolated place of rare beauty midway between Rome and 
Naples, overlooking the countryside. Here he looked in on 
himself and down on the world (inspescit et  despexi t ) .  Na- 
ture was not to interfere with the soul’s salvation. Much 
later and more surprisingly, Petrarch, sometimes called not 
altogether correctly “the first of modern men,” while stand- 
ing on a mountain-top, desires to view the beauty of the 
scene below. Then, remembering his St. Augustine as he 
looks, he recalls that Augustine would have him search his 
own heart. However, though there was no place for the 
beauty of nature in most mediaeval religious literature, cer- 
tain knowledge of nature might edify and show forth God’s 
purpose unto men. “Spiritual truth and moral truth tran- 
scended the truth of material facts,” and “Natural science 
was, indeed, concerned with the lowest and faintest form of 
reality, namely, the material world; [yet] even material 
things had their spiritual implications, and because of this 
were worthy of an orderly survey.”5E In these words Bre- 
haut finds a justification in the mediaeval scheme for the 
study of the world of phenomena and matter, for an exam- 
ination of the particular, the concrete, and the disparate. 
Nevertheless, the mediaeval mind is ever painfully con- 
scious of the untraversable abyss that separates man’s 
evanescent and transitory home below from that world with- 
out end which was promised as the ultimate reward of a 
truly contrite heart. These two realms were separated by 
the irrefragable judgment of their creator, so that no earthly 
102 Public Lectures 
wisdom or knowledge could ever bridge the gap, opened by 
Adam’s &,-a judgment that could be shaken only by a 
miracle of saving grace. However, to the eyes upturned to 
God through love of Jesus was granted a holy vision that 
revealed even the gross world as a mystic sacrament with 
virtue which could save. These mysteries were expounded 
most fully by Hugh of St. Victor who presents his theory 
of the universe in a great treatise on the Sacraments. 
For  our purpose is to treat of the sacrament of man’s redemption. T h e  
work of creation was completed in six days, the work of restoration in 
six ages. T h e  latter work we define as the Incarnation of the Word  and 
what in and through the flesh the Word  performed, with all His sacra- 
ments, both those which from the beginning prefigured the Incarnation 
and those which follow to declare and preach i t  till the end?’ 
Thus, the earth, man and all his works, and all human knowl- 
edge combine to  illumine the hidden road and join in the mir- 
acle whereby the impassable is passed. In this labor of love 
Isidore shared in his humble way. T h e  degree of his foolish- 
ness can be measured only in terms of the quality both of the 
soul and of the mind of his critic. I have neither answered 
the question with which I began nor have I left it  unan- 
swered. Under the long evening light of Eternity, the words 
of St. Paul carry across the mediaeval centuries admonishing 
us that the wisdom of this world is but foolishness in the 
sight of God, and amid these Gothic shadows the voices of 
the skeptics, reiterating their petulant query “What is the 
Truth ?” sound thinly, attenuating into empty silence, uncon- 
vincing and disregarded. And beneath the all-embracing 
majesty of God the world and its creatures stand for one 
brief moment of history, transfigured by His  Glory. 
FLOYD SEYWAXD LEAR. 
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